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This paper studies the issue of political support for environmental taxes. The envi-
ronmental tax is determined by majority voting, given a refund rule that speci¯es the
allocation of tax proceeds. The refund rule is chosen either by a welfare maximizing
constitutional planner or through a majority voting scheme. We show that if labor
and capital income taxes are reduced in the same proportion, to keep the government's
budget balanced, majority voting yields a rate of environmental taxation that is lower
than the optimal (Pigouvian) level. The equilibrium tax rate is increasing in the pro-
portion of tax reductions based on wage incomes. The tax will nevertheless remain
below the Pigouvian tax, if median wage income is less than mean wage income. The
social planner mitigates this negative bias through a higher proportional reduction in
labor income taxes than in capital income taxes. A sequential vote procedure yields,
under some conditions, the social optimum. However, it may also yield an excessive
environmental tax.
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JEL Classi¯cation: H23, D72.1 Introduction
The design of environmental policies has assumed a more urgent tone in recent years.
In part, this re°ects the continued interest of the general public and the mass media
in environmental issues. One important aspect of the design problem is its \political
feasibility". The adoption of any particular environmental policy, whether taxation,
quotas or tradeable permits, is, at least in the industrialized countries, subject to its
passage through a complex political process. This is all the more contentious because
such policies invariably entail losers and winners. Consequently, policy makers are
subject to a considerable amount of political pressure so much so that even a well-
informedand benevolent government may notbe able to implementan otherwise optimal
policy. The role of the political process in arriving at a particular policy must thus be
explicitly recognized and studied.
The economics literature has thus far studied environmental policies mainly from a
welfare economics perspective. In particular, it has, over the past two decades, examined
the impact and the design of policies in various second-best settings.1 Political economy
considerations have been introduced only very recently and by few authors; see e.g. BÄ os
(2000), Brett and Keen (2000), Marsiliani and RenstrÄ om (2000), and Boyer and La®ont
(1998). This is rather surprising for the impact of political process has been extensively
studied for other areas of government intervention.2
This paper examines the issue of political support for environmental taxes. We
are particularly interested in the properties of environmental taxes that must have the
backing of the voters. Are such taxes e±cient? If not, are there supporting mecha-
nisms that may restore e±ciency, or at least mitigate the extent of the ine±ciency? In
addressing these questions, we shall assume that environmental taxes are determined
1See e.g., Sandmo (1975), Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994) or, more recently, Cremer et al.(1998)
and Cremer and Gahvari (2001).
2A recent application is in the area of social insurance; see, e.g. Casamatta et al.(2000), and De
Donder and Hindriks (1998). Regulatory policies are considered by La®ont (1996).
1through majority voting. Moreover, to make these taxes more agreeable, we assume
that their proceeds will be refunded to taxpayers. We further assume that the \refund
rule" is determined prior to the tax rate. This sequential nature of the decision making
overcomes the problem of multi-dimensionality in policy space.3
We envisage two di®erent procedures to determine the refund rule. First, we con-
sider the (constitutional) choice by a welfare maximizing authority who anticipates the
induced voting equilibrium. This analysis combines normative and positive features.
Then we adopt an entirely positive view by considering a sequential voting scheme.
The main lesson that emerges is that the refund rule plays a crucial role in determin-
ing the political support for environmental taxation. In the normative (constitutional
choice) setting, the rule can be manipulated to induce a more desired outcome. In the
positive procedure, the interaction between the two dimensions is even more complex.
Our analysis is based on an economy where individuals derive income from capital
and labor, a higher income level is associated with a higher share of capital income, and
the median income is less than average income. The proceeds of a tax on a polluting
good are rebated through reductions of taxes on labor and/or capital incomes. The
refund rule speci¯es the proportion of tax proceeds that must be refunded on the basis
of labor incomes.
We show that if labor and capital taxes are reduced in the same proportion (e.g.
proceeds are used to reduce a tax on global income), then majority voting yields a
rate of environmental taxation which is lower than the optimal (Pigouvian) level. The
(constitutional) planner will always be able to mitigate this negative bias by refunding a
higher proportion of labor incomes than of capital incomes. It can even totally eliminate
the bias, depending on the speci¯cs of wage distributions (speci¯cally, if median is
3In a companion paper, Cremer et al. (2001), we examine the implications of reversing this voting
sequence. There, we will also study the properties of environmental taxes assuming other voting mech-
anisms, including simultaneous voting, the Shepsle procedure and the Besley-Coate citizen candidacy
setting.
2greater or equal to mean wage income).
Turning to the sequential vote procedure, we show that it yields, under some con-
ditions, the (constrained) social optimum. However, one cannot rule out the possibility
of an excessive environmental tax either.
Finally, our analysis sheds some new light on the so called double dividend hypoth-
esis. This theory suggests that the recycling of tax revenues (in particular through
reduction in taxes on labor income) is a crucial ingredient of environmental tax policy.
We argue that the signi¯cance of this aspect is not necessarily linked to the reduction of
distortions associated with the pre-existing taxes. Instead, it plays an important role in
ensuring political support for a policy which otherwise would be infeasible. Speci¯cally,
the political support argument may call for a refund through reductions in labor taxes.
2 The model
Individuals are identi¯ed by a parameter µ which is continuously distributed over [0;1]
according to the density function, f(µ). The associated cumulative distribution function
is F(µ). Population size is normalized at one. An individual of type µ has a total income
of m(µ), with
m(µ) = w(µ) + r(µ);
where w(µ) is labor and r(µ) is capital income. All sources of income are exogenous
and individuals are ranked such that m0(µ) > 0, i.e., total income increases with µ. Let











Let b µ be the median individual (satisfying F(b µ) = 1=2), and denote his capital, wage
and total income by b r ´ r(b µ), b w ´ w(b µ), and b m ´ m(b µ). Throughout the paper, we
shall assume that the distribution of incomes satisfy:
3Assumption 1 Wage and capital incomes satisfy the following properties:
(i) w0(µ) > 0, r0(µ) > 0,
(ii) r(µ)=w(µ) increases with µ,
(iii) b m < m,
(iv) b w=w > b r=r,
(v) r(0)=w(0) < r=w < r(1)=w(1).
Assumptions (i){(ii) tell us thata higher µ corresponds to higher levels of both capital
and labor incomes, and to a larger share of capital income. Assumption (iii) re°ects the
stylized fact that median income is typically less than average income. Assumption (iv)
asserts that the ratio of median to average income is larger for labor than for capital
income. This captures the fact that the distribution of capital income is typically more
asymmetric than labor income, with a small number of individuals having very high
capital income levels. A su±cient condition for (iv), given assumptions (i){(iii), is that
the person with average total income has a capital income less than average capital
income.4 Finally, assumption (v), which concerns the capital to labor income ratios at
the end points of the distribution, ensures that r(µ)=w(µ) will be greater than r=w for
some individuals, and less than it for others.
All individuals have identical quasi-linear preferences over a numeraire good (non-
polluting) and a polluting good, y. The goods are produced by a linear technology
subject to constant returns to scale in a competitive environment. Normalize the pro-
ducer price of y at one. Let q denote the consumer price of y, I(µ) the disposable income
(net of taxes or transfers) and Y the total consumption of y (across all individuals).
The indirect utility function of an individual of type µ is given by:
v(q;I;Y ) = a(q)+ I(µ)¡ '(Y ); (1)
4Formally, denote the person with average total income m by µ
a, i.e. m(µ
a) = m. Then, r(µ
a) ￿ r,
coupled with assumptions (i){(iii), ) b w=w > b r=r.
4where '(Y) is twice and a(q) is thrice continuously di®erentiable with a0(q) < 0, '0(Y ) >
0, and '00(Y ) ¸ 0. Total consumption of the polluting good thus creates a negative










y(q)f(µ)dµ = y(q) = y(q); (3)
so that total, average and individual consumption levels are all equal. Observe that this
relationship holds only for equilibrium quantities; a variation in a single individual's
consumption of y has no impact on Y .
The existing tax structure consists of labor and capital income taxes. Good y is
to be subjected to a \pollution tax" levied at the rate of (q ¡ 1) per unit of output.
The proceeds of the tax are refunded through reductions in labor and capital income
taxes. To simplify notation, we do not include pre-existing income taxes explicitly. This
implies that the net of tax income of individual µ is given by
I(µ) = (1 +gr)r(µ)+ (1+ gw)w(µ); (4)
where gr ¸ 0 and gw ¸ 0 (with at least one strictly positive) are the refund rates on
capital and wage income taxes.6
Note that constraining the tax structure to consist only of labor and capital income
taxes implies that there will be no lump-sum refunds. Allowing for lump-sum taxation,
yields the trivial result that the government can always achieve a ¯rst-best outcome
using this instrument. However, this outcome is an artifact of our two other simplifying
5We are assuming that I(µ) is \su±ciently large" for all types so that their consumption of the
numeraire good is also positive.
6This rules out the \possibility" that one may want to subsidize y rather than tax it. Such an
outcome can arise if the marginal social damage of emissions is very small. It will be of no relevance to
any of the problems we consider, provided that the marginal social damage is \su±ciently large".
5assumptions, namely, lack of distortionary taxation and homogeneity of preferences.
These features are plainly absent in a more complex world which renders lump-sum
taxation either infeasible (if di®erential) or undesirable (if uniform).7
Denote the government tax revenues by R(q) where
R(q) = (q ¡ 1)y(q): (5)
Note that, in view of (3), R(q) denotes total tax revenues, average tax revenues, and the
tax revenue collected from each person. The tax and refund rates are related through
the government's budget constraint8
R(q) = (q ¡ 1)y(q) = grr + gww: (6)
Observe that, in light of (6), the government has only two degrees of freedom in choosing
its policy instruments. Once q and, say, gr are set, gw is automatically determined. To
represent this in a more symmetric way and to characterize the refund system through
a single parameter, we introduce the concept of a \refund rule". The rule speci¯es the
proportion of tax proceeds that must be refunded on the basis of wage incomes. This
proportion, denoted by ®, is de¯ned formally as
gww = ®R(q) = ®(q ¡1)y(q): (7)
7For example, if the externality a®ects di®erent people di®erently (i.e. '(Y ) in (1) depends on one's
type), lump-sum refunds will in general no longer be su±cient to achieve a ¯rst-best outcome. Our
rationale for disallowing lump-sum taxes is thus the same as in a Ramsey world. It is adopted not
because it is deemed \realistic". Instead, it is intended to capture other complexities that the simple
structure of a model such as ours leaves out.
8Alternatively, we can explicitly introduce the existing taxes on capital and wage income. Then the
government's budget constraint is given by
b trr +b tww = R;
where ^ tr and ^ tw are the tax rates while R is the revenue requirement. Introducing environmental
taxation and giving rebates, we will have
(q ¡ 1)y(q) + (^ tr ¡ gr)r + (^ tw ¡ gw)w = R;
which is equivalent to (6).
6Through (6), this implies








with 0 ￿ ® ￿ 1 due to the restriction on the signs of gr and gw. The tax-cum-refund
policy is then completely characterized by the pollution tax (or the consumer price of
y) and by the refund rule; i.e. by the two parameters q and ®.
Throughout the paper, we shall assume that the pollution tax is determined through
a majority voting process. The vote takes place conditional on the refund rule, namely,
for a given value of ®. We consider two mechanisms for determination of ®. In one, ® is
set by a welfare-maximizing public authority; and in the other, it is determined through
a majority voting process. In either case, our analysis requires the determination of
qE(®), a function specifying the majority voting equilibrium induced by a given value
of ®. This is discussed in the next section. Before turning to this problem, however, we
will examine the nature of the optimal tax in our setting.
2.1 Optimal tax benchmark





Using the expression for the individual's net income in (4), the government's budget
constraint (6), the expression for Y in (3), and rearranging, we obtain
WF = a(q) + m +(q ¡1)y(q) ¡'(y(q)): (10)
Observe that this expression is independent of ®; that is, the value of ® has no bearing
on social welfare. This is because, with quasi-linear preferences, redistributional con-
siderations do not matter (with a utilitarian objective): all individuals have a constant
9Maximizing a utilitarian welfare function is here equivalent to maximizing total surplus.
7marginal utility of income of one. Maximizing WF with respect to q, assuming an
interior optimum, yields
(qF ¡1) = '0(Y F); (11)
where Y F = y(qF).10 This is the standard Pigouvian tax rule so that qF denotes the
¯rst-best value of q. In words, the per unit tax on the polluting good, (qF ¡1), equals
the marginal social damage of the externality.11
3 The pollution tax under majority voting
Throughout this section assume that ® is given with 0 ￿ ® ￿ 1. We ¯rst tackle the
problem of the existence of a majority voting level of q for any given value of ®. The
proof of this Lemma, and all other proofs, are in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 For any ® 2 [0;1], there exists a majority voting equilibrium level of q; it
is given by the most preferred choice of the median individual. Denoting the voting
equilibrium by qE(®) and the most preferred level of q of an individual µ 2 [0;1] by
q¤(µ;®), we have
qE(®) = q¤(b µ;®); 8® 2 [0;1]:
3.1 Tax preferences of a µ-type person
To determine the properties of the voting equilibrium qE(®) = q¤(b µ;®), we must examine
the properties of q¤(µ;®); i.e., the most preferred value of q for an individual of type
10The second-order condition is (1¡'
00y
0)y
0 < 0 at q
F; this is satis¯ed in light of '
00(:) ¸ 0 and y
0(:) <
0. Note also that, with '(:) and y(:) monotonic (and twice continuously di®erentiable), @W
F=@q =
[(q ¡ 1) ¡ Á
0(y(q))]y
0(q) has a unique solution at q
F, and is always positive to the left of q
F and negative
to its right. This implies that W
F is increasing everywhere to the left of q
F and decreasing to its right,
with q
F yielding the global maximum.
11This rule holds at any Pareto e±cient solution, utilitarian or otherwise. That it applies here,
despite the absence of a lump-sum tax instrument, re°ects the fact that with a utilitarian objective and
quasi-linear preferences, redistributional concerns do not matter.
8µ. Thus incorporate the government's budget constraint in the µ-type's indirect utility
function [using (1), (4), (7) and (8)] to obtain the reduced indirect utility function,













This equation can further be simpli¯ed as,
V(q;®;µ) = a(q) +m(µ) + ±(µ;®)R(q) ¡ '(y(q)); (12)
where







Note that ±(µ;®) shows what proportion of his tax payment a person of type µ gets






Note also that because R(q) is equal to the average tax revenue, which in turn is equal
to average refunds, ±(µ;®) also denotes the ratio of one's refunds to average refunds.
It is clear from (12) that the size of ±(µ;®) is a crucial determinant of the impact
of q on V(q;®;µ). Moreover, ±(µ;®) is the only direct channel through which ® a®ects
V (q;®;µ). Lemma 2 summarizes the properties of ±(µ;®) that will be useful in our
future discussions.
Lemma 2 Let ±(µ;®), de¯ned by (13), denote the proportion of the tax payment that a
person of type µ gets back in refunds. We have:
(i) ±(µ;®) is an increasing function of µ: ±µ(µ;®) > 0.








(iii) There exists a unique value e µ at which ±®(e µ) = 0. Further, ±®(µ) > 0 , µ < e µ,
and ±®(µ) < 0 , µ > e µ.
(iv) ±®(b µ) > 0 so that b µ < e µ.
9Observe that e µ denotes the person for whom ±(µ;®) is independent of ® so that varying





and assume V (q;®;µ) has an interior maximum and that q¤(µ;®) is continuous in µ





@q2 < 0: (15b)
To examine the properties of q¤(µ;®), evaluate @WF=@q at q¤(µ;®). Di®erentiating (10)








R0(q) = y(q) +(q ¡1)y0(q);
is the marginal tax revenue, and
@V(q;®;µ)
@q





Finally, evaluate (16) at q¤(µ;®) to obtain
@WF
@q
= [1 ¡±(µ;®)]R0 (q¤(µ;®)): (18)
Recall from (13) that ±(µ;®) shows the proportion of one's tax payment that a
person gets back in refunds. Thus, assuming R0(q¤) > 0,12 equation (18) tells us that
12This assumption is necessarily satis¯ed in the absence of a negative externality as, in that case, no
one would vote for a tax rate that is on the downward section of the La®er curve; see, Guesnerie and
Jerison (1991). Observe also that R
0(q
¤(µ;®)) > 0 guarantees that q
¤(µ;®) is monotone in µ. To see
this, note that dq
¤(µ;®)=dµ has the same sign as @
2V (q
¤(µ;®);®;µ)=@µ@q. This follows from totally
di®erentiating @V (q









¤(µ;®)), where ±µ(µ;®) > 0.
10an individual of type µ prefers a tax which is larger, equal to, or smaller than the
Pigouvian tax according to whether he receives more, the same, or less in refunds than
he pays in taxes. This makes a lot of sense. If the individual receives a full refund of
his tax, he would opt for a Pigouvian tax. This is to be expected as the Pigouvian tax
maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function that embeds no redistributive concerns.
If the tax results in a net positive transfer to the individual he will prefer to have a
larger than Pigouvian tax. Similarly, if he ends up with a net negative transfer, he
would want a smaller than Pigouvian tax.
3.2 Properties of the majority voting equilibrium
In light of (18), we can now examine the properties of qE. Before investigating this for
any value of ®, however, consider the special case when ® is such that gr = gw = g. In
this case, from (4), an individual's net income is equal to I(µ) = (1 + g)m(µ), so that
one's tax refunds is proportional to one's total income. Using (7) and (8), one can easily
verify that in this case









Given the properties of WF and the assumption that m(b µ) < m, it follows from (18)
that:
Proposition 1 Assume R0(qE(®)) > 0 where ® is the value of ® at which gr = gw = g.
Then at ® = ®, majority voting results in a pollution tax which is smaller than the
Pigouvian tax; that is, qE(®) < qF.
This accords well with one's intuition. When refunds are proportional to income,
the median voter receives b m=m of his tax payments in refunds. With the median income
11being less than average income, this ratio is less than one and the median voter faces a
net negative transfer. Consequently, he favors a smaller than Pigouvian tax.
We now return to the voting problem for an arbitrary level of ®. It is clear from
(18) that the crucial determining factor is whether, in balance, the median voter faces
a positive or a negative transfer. Not surprisingly this depends on the distributions of
wage and capital incomes and speci¯cally on the properties of the median individual's
wage and capital income relative to average wage and capital incomes. With b m < m,
we know of course that we cannot simultaneously have b w > w, and b r > r. From
Assumption 1, we also know that b w=w > b r=r. These properties imply b r < r, but they
are not su±cient to rank b w and w. We have
Proposition 2 Assume, for all ® 2 [0;1], R0(qE(®)) > 0. Then
(i) qE(®) is increasing in ®.
(ii) If b w ¸ w, 9® 2 [0;1] for which qE(®) = qF. This value of ® satis¯es







(iii) If b w < w, qE(®) < qF for all ® 2 [0;1].
The intuition for this proposition comes from equations (12), (14), and (17). With
b w=w > b r=r, ±®(b µ) > 0, so that an increase in ® increases the share of the tax revenue
which is reimbursed to the median voter. Consequently, his net marginal bene¯t of the
tax increases and he favors a larger tax. This explains part (i). Now, if b w is larger than
(or equal to) w, then by putting more weight on wage incomes in the refund formula,
we can insure that the median voter would receive enough refunds (resulting in a zero
net transfer) to face the correct tradeo® and choose the Pigouvian tax. This is what
part (ii) of the proposition tells us. The intuition for part (iii) is that if b w < w, the
median voter would always receive a refund less than his tax payment. Consequently,
he would vote for a smaller than Pigouvian tax regardless of the size of ®.
12The next two sections discuss the determination of ®, for which we consider two
di®erent procedures. Both of them are sequential in nature, and their second stage is
the voting game we have just analyzed. They di®er, however, in their speci¯cation of the
¯rst stage. In the next section, we adopt a normative viewpoint. We study the choice
of ® by a welfare maximizing authority who is constrained by the political process, i.e.,
by the second stage voting game on q. Following that, and by way of contrast, we take
an entirely di®erent approach adopting a purely positive procedure. That is, we assume
that ® is also determined on the basis of a majority rule procedure.
4 The \optimal" level of ®
With a utilitarian social welfare function, welfare, when q corresponds to the voting





Note that V is given by (12) so that it incorporates the budget constraints of the
government and the individuals, as well as the value of Y. Substituting from (12), using





+ m +[qE(®) ¡ 1]y[qE(®)] ¡'[y(qE(®))]: (22)
The expression for WU is identical to the one for W F except that qE(®) replaces q. This
expression shows that ® has no direct impact on welfare; it a®ects W U only indirectly,
through its e®ect on q. Put di®erently, the sole role played by ® is that it can bring
about a \suitable" voting equilibrium in the second stage. This property arises because
redistribution does not matter here; see section 2.1.
It is now a simple exercise to determine ®U, the optimal value of ®. To maximize
(22), one sets ® to ensure that qE(®) is as close as possible to qF. The solution to this
problem follows directly from Proposition 2 and the relevant cases are presented below,
with the notation qU ´ qE(®U).
13Proposition 3 Assume, for all ® 2 [0;1], R0(qE(®)) > 0. Then (i) The optimal value











with ®U = 1, if b w ￿ w.
(ii) If b w ¸ w, the ¯rst-best solution is attained with qU = qF; otherwise, qU < qF.
Proposition 3(i) shows that a welfare maximizing government will always refund a
higher proportion of wage incomes, than of capital incomes, when rebating environmen-
tal tax revenues. (Observe that ®U > ® , gU
w > gU
r , where gU
w and gU
r denote the
optimal values of gw and gr). It also shows that if b w > w, the solution for ®U is interior
(0 < ®U < 1), and the reimbursement of the environmental tax is based on both types
of income. Otherwise, if b w ￿ w, we will have a corner solution at ® = 1 with the refunds
based entirely on labor income. Proposition 3(ii) tells us that if b w ¸ w, an appropriate
choice of the refund rule can completely neutralize the potential negative bias of the
median voter towards environmental taxation (if refunds were proportional to income).
Put di®erently, a \suitable" choice of ® ensures that the tax that emerges from the
political process is precisely the ¯rst-best Pigouvian tax. If b w < w, one continues to
use the tax refund formula to a®ect the outcome of the voting procedure. However, this
is no longer su±cient to achieve a ¯rst-best solution. That is, the negative bias of the
median voter against the environmental tax is eliminated only in part. The tax rate
will be higher than under a uniform reimbursement scheme (with gr = gw), but it falls
short of a Pigouvian solution. That outcome is politically infeasible here.
In concluding this section, we note that our results evoke an interesting parallelism
with the so-called \double dividend hypothesis"; see e.g. Goulder (1995). Proposition 3
tells us that we will always have, ®U > ® with the possibility that ®U = 1. That is to say,
(i) environmental taxes must be refunded more through a reduction in wage taxes than
in capital income taxes, and (ii) it is even possible that the refunds may have to be based
entirely on labor income. The double dividend hypothesis claims that the recycling of
14tax revenues, in particular through reductions in taxes on labor income, is a crucial
ingredient of environmental tax policy. Our results suggest that the signi¯cance of this
aspect is not necessarily linked to the reduction of distortions associated with the pre-
existing taxes, as customarily claimed. Instead, this plays an important role in ensuring
political support for a policy which would otherwise be politically infeasible. Speci¯cally,
it is the political support argument that calls for a refund through reductions in labor
taxes.
5 Sequential vote
5.1 Procedure and voters' preferences
Consider now a sequential voting scheme where ® is determined in the ¯rst stage also
on the basis of a majority rule procedure. Assume, when voting over ®, a voter will
take into account the impact of his decision on the second stage equilibrium outcome
for q, qE(®). This interaction has a drastic implication for the identity of the median
(decisive) voter in the ¯rst stage. We will see below that the median individual, b µ, will
no longer necessarily be the decisive voter in the ¯rst stage (as he was in the second
stage regardless of the choice of ®).
In the ¯rst stage, the voter µ has preferences over ® as described by
V I(®;µ) = V(qE(®);®;µ); (23)
where V is de¯ned in (12). Let
®I(µ) = arg max
®2[0;1]
[V I(®;µ)];
denote the most preferred level of ® for voter µ. One has to study the properties of
®I(µ) to characterize the voting equilibrium (if any). To this end, di®erentiate (23)














A variation in ® has two e®ects on an individual's utility: a direct e®ect, A, and an
indirect e®ect, B, associated with the induced variation in the second stage voting
equilibrium value of qE. Consider the two terms separately.
5.1.1 Direct e®ect: A




which, as long as R(q) > 0, has the same sign as ±®(µ). It follows from Lemma 2 that
A > 0 for µ < e µ, and A < 0 for µ > e µ, where e µ is the solution to ±®(µ) = 0. According
to the direct e®ect, then, all individuals in the interval µ < e µ favor ® = 1, while those
in µ > e µ favor ® = 0. This is not surprising. Low µ's have a higher proportion of labor
to capital income. They prefer ® to be as high as possible because, for a given q, a
higher ® results in higher refunds. Conversely, for people with a higher proportion of
capital to labor income (high µ's), a lower ® results in higher refunds. Recall also from
Lemma 2 that ±®(b µ) > 0 so that b µ < e µ. See Figure 1.
5.1.2 Indirect e®ect: B
The analysis of this term is more complex. First note that from Proposition 2(i),
dqE(®)=d® > 0. This suggests that the sign of the indirect e®ect is determined solely
by the sign of @V (qE(®);®;µ)=@q. Now with qE(®) = q¤(b µ;®) being the second stage
median voter's most preferred value of q, we have from (17) that @V (qE(®);®; b µ)=












Figure 1: Determination of ®I(µ)
This expression is positive if R0(qE) > 0. Put together, these properties imply
@V(qE(®);®;µ)
@q
S 0 , µ S b µ: (26)
Consequently, all voters in the interval µ < b µ prefer a lower value for q than qE(®) =
q¤(b µ;®). The opposite is true for voters to the right of the median (µ > b µ). Observe
that (26) vanishes for the median individual, for whom we will thus have B = 0. See
Figure 1.
5.1.3 Total e®ect
When A and B are of the same sign, an individual's most preferred value for ® is a
corner solution. Speci¯cally, A > 0 and B > 0 implies ®I(µ) = 1, while A < 0 and
B < 0 yields ®I(µ) = 0. When A and B are of opposite signs, no clearcut conclusion can
be drawn. The individual's most preferred ® may, but need not, be interior.13 Observe
13While the signs of A and B do not depend on ®, their absolute values are a®ected by ®. This makes
an interior solution possible.
17that for the median individual only the ¯rst term is relevant as B = 0. He will then
always choose a corner solution with ®I(b µ) = 1.
5.2 Properties of the voting equilibrium
If A were the only e®ect, the decisive voter would necessarily be b µ. He will then choose
® = 1 because ±®(b µ) > 0. However, when both e®ects are present, given the con°icting
signs of direct and indirect e®ects at both ends of the distribution, it is not a priori
clear whether the median individual is decisive or not. Nor can one be sure that an
equilibrium in fact exists. Subsection 5.3 below illustrates that the median voter may
be decisive but that it is also possible that he may not. Here, we discuss the properties
of the voting equilibrium assuming that the median voter is decisive. Let (®S;qS)
denote the equilibrium of the sequential voting game. The characterization of the voting
equilibrium is straightforward.
Proposition 4 Assume R0(qE(®)) > 0, for all ® 2 [0;1], and that a voting equilibrium
exists and the median individual is decisive so that ®S = ®I(b µ). We have:
(i) ®S = 1.
(ii) If b w ￿ w, then ®S = ®U and qS = qU ￿ qF; otherwise, ®S > ®U, and
qS > qU = qF.
Part (i) recalls the property already alluded to in Section 5.1. With b w=w > b r=r,
the refund formula puts (if an equilibrium exists and the median individual is decisive)
all the weight on wage income. Part (ii) compares the outcome of the sequential vote
to the policy adopted when ® is set by a welfare maximizing authority (Section 4).
Interestingly, the outcomes of both procedures coincide when the median individual's
wage income is less than (or equal to) mean wage income. If this condition is violated,
i.e. if b w > w, the outcomes of the two procedures will di®er. The equilibrium refund
rule under a sequential voting procedure will result in an environmental tax which is
higher than the Pigouvian rate.
185.3 The median individual may or may not be decisive
This subsection develops two simple numerical examples that satisfy all the assumptions
imposed on our general model. One illustrates the case when the median individual is
decisive, and the other when it is not. Both examples are based on the following
speci¯cation
a(q) = ¡1 ¡lnq; '(Y ) = Y 2;
w(µ) = µ2; r(µ) = µ5:
What di®erentiates the two is the distribution of types. First, assume a uniform dis-


















e µ ' 0:79:
Solving this example numerically yields a pro¯le for ®I(µ) as represented in Figure 2.
All individuals between µ ' 0:22 and µ ' 0:82 prefer a level of ® equal to one. With
a uniform density, this represents 60% of the population. It immediately follows that
® = 1 is the Condorcet winner and the median individual is the decisive voter. This is
in keeping with the result of Proposition 4 that ®S = 1.





5=3 if µ ￿ 0:2
5=9 if 0:2 < µ ￿ 0:8
5=3 if µ > 0:8
: (27)
The symmetry of the distribution implies b µ = 0:5, so that the position of the median
individual does not change. We now have















Figure 2: Pro¯le of ®I under a uniform ditribution; the median individual is decisive













Figure 3: Pro¯le of ®I under distribution (27); the median individual is not decisive
and ®S < ®I(0:5).






e µ ' 0:85:
The numerical solution to this example yields the pro¯le of ®I(µ) as represented in
Figure 3.
Now, ®I(µ) = 1 holds even for a wider range of µ's. However, one easily veri¯es
that with the density speci¯ed by (27), this interval represents less than 50% of the
population. Consequently, the median individual will no longer be decisive and one
obtains ®S < 1 = ®I(b µ).
216 Summary and conclusion
How big an environmental tax the society supports? This paper has argued that the
answer to this question is crucially in°uenced by whose income taxes are reduced in
order to keep the government's budget balanced. In studying this issue, we assumed
that the society acts on these questions sequentially. It decides ¯rst on the government's
refund rule that determines who pays what income taxes, and then on the level of the
environmental tax. The tax level is decided through a majority voting process. As to the
refund rule, we studied two procedures: a constitutional choice by a welfare maximizing
authority (who anticipates the induced voting equilibrium of the second stage), and a
majority voting scheme.
We showed that if labor and capital income taxes are reduced in the same proportion,
majority voting entails a bias against environmental taxes (assuming the median income
is smaller than mean income). That is, it yields a rate of environmental taxation that
is lower than the optimal (Pigouvian) level. We also showed that the equilibrium tax
rate is increasing in the proportion of tax reductions based on wage incomes. The
equilibrium tax will nevertheless remain below the optimal tax, if median wage income
is less than mean wage income.
We proved that the constitutional planner will always reduce the tax on the labor
income by a higher proportion than the tax on the capital income. In this way, the
planner mitigates the negative bias of the median voter against environmental taxes.
If median wage income is greater than or equal to mean wage income, the planner
eliminates the bias completely and e®ects a ¯rst-best Pigouvian tax. On the other
hand, if the median is less than mean wage income, the planner will no longer be able
to achieve the ¯rst-best outcome. It will nevertheless continue to use the refund rule to
induce a bigger environmental tax rate in the second stage. The rate will be higher than
that under a uniform tax reduction scheme, but it falls short of a Pigouvian solution.
That outcome is politically infeasible.
22This particular result explains why the supporters of environmental taxes play up
the recycling of tax revenues, particularly through reductions in wage income taxes, as
a crucial ingredient of environmental tax policy. While the recycling argument is always
framed in terms of reducing other distortionary taxes in the economy, we argued that
the real reason may lie elsewhere. Wage income tax reductions ensure support for a
policy (i.e. a tax level) which would otherwise be politically infeasible.
Finally, we studied the implications of a sequential voting procedure for the equi-
librium level of the environmental tax and the refund rule. We proved that if a voting
equilibrium exists (in the ¯rst stage), with the median individual being decisive, all
tax reductions would be based on wage incomes. Moreover, if the median wage is less
than or equal to mean wage income, the outcome would be the same as that arrived
at by the constitutional planner. On the other hand, if median is greater than mean
wage income, the equilibrium environmental tax exceeds the Pigouvian tax (and which
the social planner will induce). We also provided numerical examples illustrating the
possibilities that the median individual (the person with median income) may or may
not be decisive in voting in the ¯rst stage.
It will be interesting to study the implications of other voting procedures for our
results. A particularly challenging task is to assess the robustness of the results to the
posited sequencing of the decision making process. An obvious alternative procedure to
consider is simultaneous voting. However, one would expect that the usual limitations
of this approach associated with the problem of non-existence should apply. More
promising are the Shepsle procedure and the Besley-Coate citizen candidacy setting.14
We discuss these approaches in a sequel to this paper.
14See, e.g., Shepsle (1979) and Besley and Coate (1997).
23Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Using (1), (3), (4) and (9), the utility of individual µ, as a function
of q and gr, can be written as










Note that (A1) does not make use of (8), i.e. of the government's budget constraint. It
speci¯es the preferences as a function of ®;q and gr. It satis¯es Gans and Smart's (1996)
su±cient condition for the median individual to be decisive (in the vote over q, for
any given value of ®). This condition relies on the Spence-Mirrlees \single-crossing"
property. Applied to our setting, it requires that the marginal rates of substitution in
the space (q;gr) be monotonic in voters' type µ. Now one can easily check that the











is monotonically increasing in µ whatever the values of ®;q and gr. Hence, the median
individual is decisive when voting on (q;gr) which, given the degree of freedom lost
when incorporating (8), amounts to a vote on q.
Proof of Lemma 2: To prove (i), di®erentiate (13) partially with respect to µ. The
result follows from the assumptions that r0(µ) > 0 and w0(µ) > 0. To prove (ii),
di®erentiate (13) partially with respect to ®. This yields (14) proving the claim.












Thus ±®(µ) will always have the same sign as w(µ)=r(µ) ¡ w=r. From the assumption
that w(0)=r(0) > w=r > w(1)=r(1), it then follows that ±®(0) > 0 and ±®(1) < 0.
24Consequently, given the continuity of w(µ)=r(µ), there must exist a value of µ, say e µ, at
which ±®(e µ) = 0. Now because w(µ)=r(µ) is decreasing in µ, it also follows from (A2)
that ±®(µ) changes sign only once so that e µ is unique. Additionally, this implies that
±®(µ) > 0 as long as µ < e µ, and ±®(µ) < 0 whenever µ > e µ.
Finally, the proof of (iv) follows from evaluating (14) at b µ and the property that
b w=w > b r=r.
Proof of Proposition 2: Observe that dqE(®)=d® has the same sign as @2V(qE;®; b µ)
=@®@q. This follows from di®erentiating @V (q¤(µ;®);®;µ)=@q in (15a) totally with
respect to ® and the sign of @2V(q¤(µ;®);®;µ)=@q2 in (15b) evaluated at µ = b µ. Now
di®erentiating equation (17) partially with respect to ® yields @2V(q;®;µ)=@®@q =
±®(µ)R0(q) = (w(µ)=w ¡r(µ)=r)R0(q). Evaluated at b µ and q¤(b µ;®), this proves part (i).
Evaluating (18) at µ = b µ, while noting that ±(b µ;®) = (1 ¡ ®)r(b µ)=r + ®w(b µ)=w, proves
parts (ii){(iii).
Proof of Proposition 3: Because qF maximizes WF, it will also maximize W U (if
qF can be induced as a voting equilibrium). Thus, if b w ¸ w, from Proposition 2(ii), ®
is set as the solution to (20) ensuring qE(®) = qF. This yields the given expression for
®U. If b w < w, from Proposition 2(iii), qE(®) < qF. In this case, the properties of WF
(increasing everywhere to the left of qF and decreasing to its right) suggest that one
must \set" qE to be as close to qF as possible. Given that from Proposition 2(i), qE(®)
is increasing in ®, we must thus set ® = 1. It remains to prove that ®U > ®. Rewrite
the solution for ®U, after a bit of algebraic manipulation, as
®U =
w
w +r b w¡w
r¡b r
:
Now if b w = w, then ®U = 1 > ®. On the other hand, if b w > w,
b w ¡ w
r ¡ b r
< 1:
It then follows from the solution for ®U in above that ®U > ®.
25Proof of Proposition 4: Part (i) follows from equation (25) and the fact that, from
(26), the indirect e®ect B is always zero for µ = b µ. To prove (ii), ¯rst consider the
case where b w ￿ w. Proposition 3 shows that in this case, ®U = 1. Comparison with
(i) above proves that ®S = ®U. To prove qS = qU, note that in both procedures
the value of q is determined by majority voting, given the value of ®. Consequently,
®S = ®U => qE ¡
®S¢
= qS = qU = qE ¡
®U¢
. Next assume b w > w. From Proposition 3,
we have that in this case 0 < ®U < 1. Comparison with ®S = 1 proves that ®S > ®U.
Moreover, given that from Proposition 2(i),
@qE
@® > 0, we have qS > qU:
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